GEOFF BENNETT: For perspective on the Israeli attack on Gaza, we get two views now.

Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a longtime State Department official in both Democratic and Republican administrations.

And Hussein Ibish is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.

Thank you both for being with us.

So, Israel and Hamas were supposed to be holding talks on the truce's second phase, which would end the war, release more hostages.

How do you explain Israel's latest attack on Gaza?

HUSSEIN IBISH, Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute: Well, I think the Israelis never were interested in phase two, because phase two means, practically speaking, the end of the war.

As phase one reached its conclusion, Israel decided to change the rules of the game.

They demanded the release of all hostages.

That was supposed to come at the end of phase two.

But because they realized that phase two means, practically speaking, ending the war, they don't want that.

They want the war to continue, especially Netanyahu does for personal political reasons, but also for ideological reasons.

So he took the opportunity of several disputes to start the war again in a big way.

And among the 400 people killed are 130 children, according to UNICEF, the U.N. agency that helps children.

That's a really horrendous toll.

GEOFF BENNETT: Aaron David Miller, how do you see it, this idea that Israel was never really interested in the second phase?

AARON DAVID MILLER, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: I mean, it's great to be here with you and with Hussein.

Look, from the beginning of this three-phase agreement, even from the conceptualization of it in the Biden administration, I think most of the negotiators believe that there would never be an implementation of phase two.

They thought they'd get through phase one, but phase two enjoins vote parties to do things they are simply not prepared to do without sufficient guarantees.

Hamas will not release all of the hostages, which is supposed to occur at the end of phase two or the beginning of phase three, unless they had ironclad assurances that Israel would end the war and withdraw from Gaza.

And no Israeli government -- let's be very clear.

Not the most extreme right-wing in Israel's history, the one you have now, or even a centrist government, is going to withdraw its forces from Gaza and give up the right of preventative and -- preemptive and preventative attacks without some sort of security structure.

And they would still insist, I suspect, in the wake of the shadow of October 7, overall responsibility for security.

So there was never going to be a phase two.

What's happening, however, and I think Hussein makes a very good point, the Netanyahu administration sold a revised phase two to the Trump administration.

HUSSEIN IBISH: Exactly.

AARON DAVID MILLER: And Donald Trump essentially acquiesced and is essentially enabling or is permitting the Israelis to determine the tactics and even the strategy about the next phase, whatever the next phase is going to be.

And it is return to military confrontation.

There's no doubt about it.

HUSSEIN IBISH: Exactly.

GEOFF BENNETT: I hear you.

Expand on that.

HUSSEIN IBISH: Well, I think that's exactly right.

I think Netanyahu wants to continue fighting.

And, in fact, there's every evidence that he wants to go back to the future, that what he's looking for is a modified -- return to a modified version of the status quo anti, where, whenever -- wherever Israel withdraws from Gaza, Hamas returns to a kind of quasi-power, pokes its head up, only to get slammed again.

Israel used to call this mowing the grass.

And I think they're going to -- they're returning to that in a way, except the grass is going to be cut as soon as it's visible.

You know, it's going to be cut very close to the ground.

I think there's -- the reason we're in this situation where there's no possibility of another endgame, other than a return to fighting, is Netanyahu's steadfast determination over almost a year-and-a-half to refuse to even begin discussing the possibility of an alternative to Hamas rule of Palestinian civil administration, because Palestinian politics are binary.

Either you strengthen Hamas or you strengthen the secular nationalists of Fatah.

He wants to keep Hamas in a kind of power in Gaza to continue splitting the Palestinians.

This has been his strategy to prevent Palestinian statehood for 20 years.

I don't think he wants to end that.

I think he wants to keep the Palestinians divided, keep Gaza chaotic, keep everything going as close to some version of the status quo ante as possible.

And there's no way he's going to risk allowing Palestinians to unite under the Palestinians who want to talk to Israel and make a deal, even if it means propping up and supporting the quasi-rule in Gaza of the Palestinians who want to kill and kidnap Israelis.

I think that's the gruesome truth.

GEOFF BENNETT: What do we know about the strength of Hamas at this moment, Aaron David Miller, and what does all this mean for the Palestinians in Gaza?

AARON DAVID MILLER: I mean, I think the reality is -- there are two realities here.

And Hussein knows well this is not one hand clapping.

These are two combatants who are pledged to one another's mutual destruction.

And the Israelis -- the Israelis suffered an enormous trauma on October 7, from which the public, the IDF, the Israeli Defense Forces, are still reeling, the shame, the humiliation, the vulnerability, the sexual predation, the raping, the mutilation, the taking of hostages.

All of these things have injected a new urgency in Israel's conception of its own security.

And I think the problem is -- and Hussein again is correct in asserting that because of Mr. Netanyahu's political problems - - and let's be clear, on trial for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust in a Jerusalem district court four years and running.

He must maintain himself in power or face a possible conviction or prison time or a plea bargain that would essentially drive him out of politics.

And that means avoiding the kinds of alternatives that Hussein has laid out, an emboldened Palestinian Authority, a pathway to two states, which, frankly, right now is a thought experiment.

I think Hamas is resurgent to some degree, in answer to your question.

They're repurposing Israeli unexploded munitions.

They're retraining -- Secretary of State Blinken in December -- I think he regrets having said it -- essentially said that Hamas has now recruited nearly as many fighters as the Israelis have killed.

And they may be unpopular, but there is no alternative.

And while you can't defeat an idea, you can make this that idea less relevant.

And the Israelis certainly have not been forthcoming in trying to make that possible.

HUSSEIN IBISH: They have allowed no alternative, is the point.

And it's like taking water out of a bathtub.

The other water will come in.

They have got to allow the idea of a Palestinian alternative to Hamas or you're going to get Hamas.

They know that.

This is not accidental.

This is a strategic choice.

Well, I think we have to be honest about that.

Netanyahu's strategy here is not just to keep the war going, but to keep the war with Hamas going.

Everything Aaron said about Israeli trauma is right, but it -- Israelis are not traumatized enough not to realize that, in Palestinian politics, you have to choose between Fatah, which wants to talk and make a deal, or Hamas, which wants to kill and kidnap and mutilate and everything Aaron said.

And the sad part is that Netanyahu apparently would prefer to deal with Hamas in Gaza than in any way strengthen the hand of those who might one day succeed in creating a Palestinian state, because the ultimate goal is annexation in the West Bank, and that that is the paramount goal.

GEOFF BENNETT: Hussein Ibish, Aaron David Miller, thank you both for your insights.

AARON DAVID MILLER: You're very welcome.

Thank you.